Cover Up? Doubtful

When I last posted on the Able Danger situation, only one person, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer (USA), had come forward to confirm that Able Danger, a small military intelligence task force, had, in 2000, informed the DOD of the suspicion that Egyptian immigrant Mohammed Atta was a terrorist. That suspicion was born out by the events of 9/11/2001. Nothing about these findings was mentioned in the 9/11 Commission’s report, however.

The number of persons backing LTC Shaffer’s story has grown to include several other military members and at least two civilians.

"You could touch the picture and literally drill down and it would give you all the facts that we had from whatever source we had, we identified our sources and then why we had made a link," says [civilian] defense contractor J.D. Smith, describing how Able Danger's computer software program worked.

The team collected and analyzed information gathered by the "deep" data mining operation. As most following this story know, data mining is gathering information from open, unclassified sources to analyze intelligence matters and come to conclusions about those matters. There have been several new twists to the story while our eyes were focused on the Gulf Coast.

A couple of aspects of this unfolding story, however, are being distorted, IMO, because of lack of knowledge.

US Persons

Able Danger's surveillance activities were stopped because, allegedly, names of many ‘US persons’ were showing up in the reports. The Defense Department follows laws forbidding the surveillance of US Persons, called Intelligence Oversight. Here is the appropriate definitional blurb:

The term "U.S. persons" includes U.S. citizens, but is broader. It also includes permanent resident aliens, unincorporated associations substantially composed of U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, and corporations incorporated in the U.S. and not directed and controlled by a foreign government.

Conducting surveillance on US persons on purpose is strictly forbidden to American military intelligence assets. When it happens incidentally, the intelligence asset has only 90 days to determine whether the information is relevant to national security or not. If nothing has been determined in the time allotted, the information must be destroyed BY LAW.

Present Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense William Dugan for Intelligence Oversight testified yesterday, however, that Mohamed Atta did not fall under the heading of US Person (he was here on a student visa), but I’m betting that this fine distinction wasn’t clear to the military and/or civilian leadership of the time. I’m not finding fault (in this case), but merely stating the probabilities. Many--myself included--thought that the phrase US Person meant anyone who was in the country legally.

Why the Pentagon Blocked Witness Testimony

Several people--military members and DOD civilian contractors--who were involved in the Able Danger program, have expressed their willingness to come forward and testify on the program’s findings.

The Pentagon, however, has blocked the testimony of these people with this explanation from the SECDEF, Donald Rumsfeld: "We have to obey the laws with respect to security classifications." Anyone with any military intelligence experience can figure out that this is true and what it means: the Pentagon wants to know beforehand what these witnesses are going to say. Does the word ‘intelligence’ ring conjure any other words like ‘security’ or ‘secrecy’ in any minds? The witnesses want to testify on possibly classified matters. They could inadvertently expose information and/or sources while telling what they know. Is it likely? No. It would be ridiculous, however, to take that chance on several different witnesses without debriefing them first. That’s just the way these guys operate, Captain Ed. These military persons and civilians signed papers stipulating that they would protect any classified material and we onlookers simply don’t necessarily know what’s classified and what isn’t, appearances notwithstanding.

The fact that this testimony is before the Senate Judiciary Committee and not the Senate Intelligence Committee or the Senate Armed Forces Committee probably has a great deal to do with the Pentagon’s decision also.

*****

In past posts on this subject, I have attributed the Able Danger SNAFUs to the wall of separation between Foreign and domestic intelligence agencies created by Clinton Administration Assistant Attorney General Jamie Gorelick. That attribution was probably an error on my part. Looking at this situation again, I think that the civilian leadership personnel in the Defense Department of that time were unclear on certain aspects of the Able Danger program that fell under the Intelligence Oversight Laws and chose to err on the safe side of those laws. Had 9/11 not happened, it would have been a reasonably good decision. (Anyone who reads this blog regularly knows that I’m no Clinton apologist.)

The Defense Department has been between a rock and a hard place for about forty years. It implemented Intelligence Oversight to curb the government excesses of the 60’s and 70’s* and now that decision has turned around to bite all of us in the butt. The decisions of thirty years ago, of five years ago and of today are not—for the most part--being criticized fairly because sometimes consequences are unforeseen—unless people are accusing the DOD of the inability to tell the future with pinpoint accuracy. That’s what people like Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter (R-PA; who is real getting on my nerves) and certain members of the right side of the blogophere seem to be doing. The Pentagon is doing its job when it seeks to protect potentially classified information and shouldn’t been castigated for excessive secrecy and caution because of it; there no such thing as transparent intelligence. It’s also doing its job when it seeks to protect the rights of citizens and guests in this country. Which one do you want the most? You can't have both to the n^th degree.

We are sure to see, however, whether the rather honest—if detrimental—mistake of letting Mohamed Atta be is related to the reason(s) 9/11 Commission left all references to Able Danger out of its report.

UPDATE:

Continuous updates at The Strata-Sphere, though his conclusions are different than mine.

Able Danger Officer Named
Mea Culpa?
Commission Retort
Commission Admission
Oh That Mohammed Atta
Placing Blame

*Here is the reason for the implementation of Intelligence Oversight.

The perceived need for a Department of Defense (DoD) Intelligence Oversight (IO) program came about as a result of certain activities conducted by DoD intelligence and counter-intelligence units against U.S. persons involved in the Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam War movements. During the 1960s and 1970s, the United States experienced significant civil demonstrations from protesters associated with these movements. Some of these demonstrations were believed to be beyond the ability of civilian authorities to control, and military forces were used to assist in the restoration of order. Units deploying for this purpose discovered they needed basic pre-deployment intelligence to perform their missions. The Army, designated as executive agent for providing aid to civilian authorities, requested assistance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). When the FBI was unable to provide the information needed, the Army began collecting it. Over time, this collection mushroomed and led to abuse of the Constitutional rights of our citizens.

Comments

[DragonLady]

"I’m betting that this fine distinction wasn’t clear to the military and/or civilian leadership of the time."

I won't disagree with you, but I will say that it should have been clear to the leadership at that time. My last AF assignment was in a Military Intelligence unit, and I was issued an Intelligence Oversight card upon my arrival there in early '99. The card was a fit-in-your-wallet size "cheatsheet" of the IO program which defined who "US Persons" were. We were given updated cards later, probably around '02, and I compared the two at the time. I only remember a difference in color.

[DragonLady]

Oh, and I agree about DOD not talking about this to just any old body. Golden rules of access to classified data: properly cleared for access to that level of classification, AND (not OR) need-to-know. :-)

[baldilocks]

"I was issued an Intelligence Oversight card upon my arrival there in early '99. The card was a fit-in-your-wallet size "cheatsheet" of the IO program which defined who "US Persons" were."

You know, of course, that we 'foot soldiers' get reminded of the rules more than do the higher-ups. That's why the latter break the rules more (see Sandy Berger).

[Justin]

Thanks. Good post. Cleared up a little confusion I had.

[NE]

I've tried to avoid the blogosphere's Able Danger bandwagon. While most of the commentary I've seen has been intelligent, it has also been relatively uninformed. Most people just don't have a good handle on intel and IO issues. You're post is (by far) the best I've seen so far. It's obviously the product of experience that most bloggers don't have.

I think you're right about how this SNAFU happened. EO 12333, 12334 etc. predate the information superhighway. It's no wonder that DoD lawyers would be hesitant to release the info. When in doubt, make like Nancy Reagan and "just say no." I think it's high time to ammend the rules on IO to address the use of open source databases and their use in homeland defense threat analysis.

[AJStrata]

Thanks for the heads up on this. I agree, I have seen little reason to get all worked up about how the Pentagon is dealing with this today. I think they would rather focus on the GWOT than deal with hindsight finger pointing.

And if the persons in charge at the time simply came forth and said 'we were to cautious, too reactive to the US person and open data" I would say that was good enough. We all had pre 9-11 mindsets that did not expect something like this *would* happen. Yes, we had millions of theoretical attack scenarios, and intel supporting each and every one of them. But it seemed like static noise at the time. It wasn't.

But I want to know for sure that is the real answer. There are other possible answers that could be really, really bad. So let's find out without hurting ourselves!

AJStrata

[baldilocks]

AJS: Fair enough and thanks!

[Vexare]

I came here just knowing you'd have a better bead on it than Cap'n Ed (who I normally agree with)and I was right.

Civilians sometimes have this idea of a monolithic Pentagon, when it is more like (to borrow from an old British comedy) "a loose confederation of warring tribes".

I think your analysis is almost perfect. I say almost, because having dealt with the General Officer fraternity quite a bit in the last half of my AF career and over the years since, I would not underestimate the inner-DoD politics. There is a real possibility some of this is "slow-leaking" as a means of damage control in an effort to save the heinie of the general who told the LTC to cease and desist. There is also a real likelyhood that some other chapter of the fraternity with an axe to grind or a righteous zeal about the truth is trying to push the info out.

I also think a lot more of this will come to light than people think, bit that could just be hope springing eternal.

[Merry Whitney]

Thank you, excellent post and comments.

I would think that this type of testimony should be restricted to closed session and, as Baldilocks pointed out, to the appropriate committee (although I recall a US Senator exiting a closed session about a national security matter, walking right up to a bank of media microphones -- and SecDef Rumsfeld's almost-successful effort to control his temper about it. 2001 but before 9/11, I believe).

Merry Whitney

[DragonLady]

"You know, of course, that we 'foot soldiers' get reminded of the rules more than do the higher-ups."

Ain't that the truth! I think that is a great deal of the problem. The 'foot soldier' aka the enlisted, don't have the education as the higher-ups and are therefore not as smart. That mentality STILL gets me all worked up. :-)

[gunjam]

Sorry, baldi, but I am not buying your Able-Danger DoD whitewash. However, I CAN forgive you, because, knowing your particular miitary background, I sense that you feel like you are defending family to some degree.

I think Specter is wearing the white hat on this. The Pentagon's (now reversed) decision to prevent testimony was a red flag that the Pentagon is not about protecting "US persons" on this Able Danger thing -- it is about Protecting Pentagon higher-ups.

This whole thing smells of cover-up city.

The amount of Able-Danger data that was destroyed was enormous -- and MOST of it was from UNCLASSIFIED sources. It would have been very valuable in FBI hands.

Here is my gut feel: That Able Danger data wasn't destroyed to protect the privacy of private citizens, it was destroyed to do CYA of Pentagon higher-ups.

Let's put it another way: If al-Qaeda had been able to infiltrate the Pentagon to thwart the Able Danger mission, would they have done things any differently than they were done?

I don't think so, and I don't believe in coincidences.

Only the evil-doers in this instance were homegrown rascals, and not al-Qaeda dirtbags.

P.S. I am following this issue on Michael Savage's talk radio show. I guess you are probably not a Savage fan.

[baldilocks]

Gunjam: Save the condescension. It will get you banned.

Bring some facts rather than your prejudices.

About Savage: has he ever worked in military intelligence either in a military or civilian capacity? If not, bringing his name up in this context is a non sequitur.

I'm disappointed in the quality of your rebuttal. Perhaps it is you who should be condescended to.

[vexare]

DragonLady,
You bring back memories! Ahh, it's like it was yesterday....

We were 400+ AF personnel deploying to a Navy base for a 179 day TDY on a tri-service exercise. In the buildup, we received two Commander's Call-style briefings in the base theater, had multiple meetings, and received numerous memos (pre-email days) on how we were 'Ambassadors in Blue' to our sister services, and how our behavior would reflect on the AF, yada..yada.. yada..

In the first week, three of our meat-servos (pilots), including the detachment commander, were banned from the O-club for fighting. We all thought "Gee, they must not have gotten the same briefings we did". Surprise!(not) The banning was the only visible outcome of the altercation: just spirited fighter jocks don't ya' know.

BTW: The Commander was later promoted and he and just about everybody else who was there the whole trip got a medal.

[jeff]

I think that the civilian leadership personnel in the Defense Department of that time were unclear on certain aspects of the Able Danger program that fell under the Intelligence Oversight Laws and chose to err on the safe side of those laws.

But remember, this happened AFTER the first WTC attack, which was intended to bring the buildings down & kill tens of thousands. It was in this context that Gorelick penned her infamous memo that the most important thing was avoiding the appearance of impropriety.

More impt than saving lives

[baldilocks]

Jeff: I thought that at first too (about Gorelick's memo) as I said in the post and in other posts. But thinking it over and going by what I know from my own experience, it makes less sense than my premise here, as much as we'd like it to be otherwise.

[Yeff]

My thoughts when I first heard about Able Danger went immediately to oversight and how that would've been adressed. I thought that way because I was also in the intelligence community during my Air Force career.

FYI, Air Force Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, DIRNSA (Director, NSA), addressed the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in October of 1991. You can find a transcript of what he said here:
http://intelligence.senate.gov/0210hrg/021017/hayden.pdf

His closing comments with regard to oversight:

"These are serious issues that the country addressed, and resolved to its satisfaction, once before in the mid-1970's. In light of the events of September 11th, it is appropriate that we, as a country, readdress them. We need to get it right. We have to find the right balance between protecting our security and protecting our liberty. If we fail in this effort by drawing the line in the wrong place, that is, overly favoring liberty or security, then the terrorists win and liberty loses in either case."

[DeMoreo Jones]

Juliette:

Thank you for your judicious take on this matter.

In my opinion, Sandy Berger should be contemplating prison time for his actions, instead of only having to pay a fine. (Since he only took and destroyed copies of the documents from the Archives, it's clear that we should find out what the originals contained, and use them to prosecute him to the fullest extent of the law.) But, as you say, it's clear from Berger's example that those at the top have the greatest leeway in the case of unethical behavior.

Re: Able Danger, I share your puzzlement regarding the Judiciary Committee's hearing this matter. A natural home for this would have been Rep. Weldon's Homeland Security Committee (or better still, the House Select Committee on Intelligence.)

I don't deny that the investigation now has sufficient momentum to keep moving for a while, but I cannot help wonder how much further we could have been on this story if a more reputable Congressman other than Curt Weldon had brought it to light. (Who can forget earlier this spring, Weldon [and other congressmen] attending Sun Myung Moon's "coronation ceremony" as 'humanity's savior and messiah', denying his attendance, and then his backpedaling on the whole affair when photos surfaced.)

Re: the 'wall', again we need to be clear about the conditions to which we are referring. As John Hinderaker notes, Jamie Gorelick's memo (and subsequent formalization by Janet Reno's memo of July 1995 only extended procedural authority over how the Criminal Division of the Justice Department communicated with the FBI in cases of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. It did not have any legal effect over Defense Department intelligence collection and reporting.

I wish that Deputy AG Larry Thompson (and AG Ashcroft) hadn't reissued these guidelines to the DoJ and FBI in 2001, but even with their doing so, Commissioner Gorton points out that it didn't have any impact on what Able Danger could have done with the intelligence they collected.

Sincerely,
DJ